

**Personal Information:**

11/6/1991, Male, U.S. Citizen

**Undergraduate Studies:**

B.A., Economics-Mathematics, Columbia University, *cum laude*, 2014

**Graduate Studies:**

Ph.D., Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2022

Thesis Title: “Essays on Urban Economics and Public Finance”

References: Upon request.

**Research Fields:**

*Primary:* Urban Economics and Real Estate, Public Finance

*Secondary:* Applied Microeconomics, Political Economy

**Teaching Experience:**

University of Pennsylvania:

|            |   |
|------------|---|
| Fall, 2020 | Managerial Economics (Executive MBA), TA for Kent Smetters        |
| Fall, 2019 | Urban Fiscal Policy (Undergraduate/MBA), TA for Fernando Ferreira |
| Fall, 2018 | Managerial Economics (Undergraduate), Head TA for Eduardo Azevedo |

Columbia University:

|            |   |
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| Fall, 2013 | Intermediate Macroeconomics (Undergraduate), TA for Jon Steinsson |
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**Research Experience and Other Employment:**

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| 2022–     | Associate, The Brattle Group   |
| 2018–2019 | Research Assistant for Fernando Ferreira and Maisy Wong<br>Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania  |
| 2017–2018 | Research Assistant for Fernando Ferreira and Joe Gyourko<br>Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania |
| 2014–2016 | Senior Research Analyst<br>Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of New York                   |

**Professional Activities:**

*Presentations:*

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|-----------|--|
| 2022      | Department of the Treasury (Office of Tax Analysis), Hong Kong University,<br>Department of Housing and Urban Development, New York University<br>(Furman Center), Syracuse University |
| 2018–2021 | Urban Economics Association, Summer School in Urban Economics, MIDAS<br>Seminar, Wharton Seminars  |

*Service:*

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| 2019 | Wharton-INSEAD Doctoral Consortium, Executive Committee, Wharton<br>Innovation Doctoral Symposium, Organizing Committee |
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### **Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

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| 2021       | Urban Economics Association Winner of Best Student Paper |
| 2021       | University of Pennsylvania Graduate Center Grant         |
| 2021       | Robert R. Nathan Fellowship                              |
| 2019, 2020 | Graduate and Professional Student Assembly Grants        |
| 2019       | Becker-Friedman Institute Price Theory Summer Camp       |
| 2019       | George James Term Fund                                   |
| 2018, 2019 | Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center Research Grants            |
| 2018, 2019 | Mack Institute for Innovation Management Research Grants |
| 2018, 2019 | Applied Economics Travel Grants                          |
| 2016–2021  | Wharton Doctoral Fellowship                              |
| 2016       | NSF Graduate Research Fellowship, Honorable Mention      |

### **Research Papers:**

#### **[“Returns to Political Contributions in Local Housing Markets”](#)**

Revise and Resubmit, *Review of Economics and Statistics*

This paper investigates whether firms donate to political campaigns in order to influence supply in local housing markets. Using new data on campaign donors of U.S. mayoral candidates and a regression discontinuity design, I uncover three findings. Consistent with political favors, connection to the mayor causes residential development firms to sell more new housing units. Favors to donors shape local housing supply, since mayors attracting more donations from residential developers double permits for new housing construction. But differences in housing policy between mayors are empirically more important than favors for determining local housing supply.

#### **[“The Anticompetitive Impacts of Exclusive Rights-of-Way and Unequal Subsidies in the Wireline Broadband Market”](#)** with Coleman Bazelon, Yong Paek, and Paroma Sanyal

Local authorities are often involved in determining the competitive landscape of important services. In particular, Section 253 of the Telecommunications Act, in part, states that a local authority cannot 'prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.' Our paper will analyze how a local authority's attempt to introduce competition (through subsidization of an ISP) in a high fixed cost and advanced technology industry, such as the broadband internet market, could actually worsen competition by restricting incumbents' ability to compete and provide services. Our analysis will calibrate a simple model of intertemporal entry and competition of the broadband internet market to anonymized proprietary data obtained from a cable broadband provider. Our data consists of information on network buildout costs at various levels of the network, from the digging of the conduit network, to the last mile drop conduit. Our model will map out the space of a set of structural parameters where various competitive equilibria arise. Key parameters will reflect important aspects of the broadband internet market. Of particular interest are aspects that local authorities guide policies over, for example, the technological compatibility of subsidized infrastructure, fair access to subsidized infrastructure, and the granting of rights-of-way (ROW) to market participants. With the model's parameter space mapped out we will discuss the considerations a local authority must consider before subsidizing an entrant ISP. Our research is of particular relevance to contemporary communications policy as access to affordable high-speed internet becomes an integral part of our lives, and federal, state and local authorities are looking for ways to achieve this.

[“Poverty Alleviation through a Large-Scale Homeownership Lottery”](#) with Rafael Pucci and Rafael Tavares

This paper evaluates whether homeownership alleviates poverty by exploiting a large-scale affordable housing program in Brazil. Linking applicants to administrative data on formal employment, we investigate the impact homeownership has on labor supply, earnings, mobility, occupation, and formalization. Becoming a homeowner increases hours worked and formal employment, suggesting wealth effects in this setting do not, on net, dampen labor supply. However, wages and earnings of new homeowners fall. The likely mechanism is homeownership programs accelerate formalization. New homeowners transition to public sector employment, and, consistent with the homevoter hypothesis, increase political participation.

**Research Paper(s) in Progress:**

*“The Influence of Public Safety Unions in Local Elections: Evidence from U.S. Cities’ Spending and Performance”* with Maria Carreri and Edoardo Teso

**Publications:**

Abrahams, Michael, Tobias Adrian, Richard Crump, Emanuel Moench, and Rui Yu. "[Decomposing Real and Nominal Yield Curves.](#)" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 84 (2016): 182-200.

**Technical Skills:**

Stata, Python, MATLAB, R, SQL, Qualtrics

**Pronunciation:**

REE YOO